Autonomy Promotion In A Multiethnic Context : Reflections On Some Normative Issues by Désy, Michel
VOLUME 5 NUMÉRO 1
PRINTEMPS/SPRING 2010
LA REVUE DU CREUM
LES ATELIERS
DE L’ÉTHIQUE
IS
SN
17
18
-9
97
7
NOTE AUX AUTEURS
Un article doit compter de 10 à 20 pages environ, simple
interligne (Times New Roman 12). Les notes doivent être
placées en fin de texte. L'article doit inclure un résumé
d'au plus 200 mots en français et en anglais. Les articles
seront évalués de manière anonyme par deux pairs du
comité éditorial.
Les consignes aux auteurs se retrouvent sur le site de la
revue (www.creum.umontreal.ca/ateliers). Tout article ne
s’y conformant pas sera automatiquement refusé.
GUIDELINES FOR AUTHORS
Papers should be between 10 and 20 pages, single spa-
ced (Times New Roman 12). Notes should be placed at the
end of the text. An abstract in English and French of no
more than 200 words must be inserted at the beginning
of the text. Articles are anonymously peer-reviewed by
members of the editorial committee.
Instructions to authors are available on the journal web-
site (www.creum.umontreal.ca/ateliers). Papers not follo-
wing these will be automatically rejected.
Vous êtes libres de reproduire, distribuer et communiquer les
textes de cette revue au public selon les conditions suivantes :
• Vous devez citer le nom de l'auteur et de la revue
• Vous ne pouvez pas utiliser les textes à des fins commerciales
• Vous ne pouvez pas modifier, transformer ou adapter les textes
Pour tous les détails, veuillez vous référer à l’adresse suivante :
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.5/legalcode
You are free to copy and distribute all texts of this journal under
the following conditions:
• You must cite the author of the text and the name of the journal
• You may not use this work for commercial purposes
• You may not alter, transform, or build upon this work
For all details please refer to the following address:
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.5/legalcode
VOLUME 5 NUMÉRO 1
PRINTEMPS/SPRING 2010
UNE REVUE MULTI-
DISCIPLINAIRE SUR LES
ENJEUX NORMATIFS DES
POLITIQUES PUBLIQUES ET
DES PRATIQUES SOCIALES.
A MULTIDISCIPLINARY
JOURNAL ON THE
NORMATIVE CHALLENGES
OF PUBLIC POLICIES
AND SOCIAL PRACTICES.
2
COMITÉ ÉDITORIAL/EDITORIAL COMMITTEE
Rédacteur en chef/Editor: Daniel Marc Weinstock, CRÉUM
Coordonnateur de rédaction/Administrative Editor: Martin Blanchard, CRÉUM (martin.blanchard@umontreal.ca)
COMITÉ EXÉCUTIF DE RÉDACTEURS / EXECUTIVE EDITORS
COMITÉ D’EXPERTS / BOARD OF REFEREES:
Éthique fondamentale : Christine Tappolet, CRÉUM
Éthique et politique : Daniel Marc Weinstock, CRÉUM
Éthique et santé : Bryn Williams-Jones, CRÉUM
Éthique et économie : Peter Dietsch, CRÉUM
Charles Blattberg, CRÉUM
Rabah Bousbaci, CRÉUM
Ryoa Chung, CRÉUM
Francis Dupuis-Déri, Université du Québec à Montréal
Geneviève Fuji Johnson, Université Simon Fraser
Axel Gosseries, Université de Louvain-la-Neuve
Béatrice Godard, CRÉUM
Joseph Heath, Université de Toronto
Mira Johri, CRÉUM
Julie Lavigne, Université du Québec à Montréal
Robert Leckey, Université McGill
Christian Nadeau, CRÉUM
Wayne Norman, CRÉUM
Luc Tremblay, CRÉUM
ISSN 1718-9977
VOLUME 5 NUMÉRO 1
PRINTEMPS/SPRING 2010
TABLE DES MATIÈRES
TABLE OF CONTENTS
3
4-22 LA MORALITÉ IMPLICITE DU MARCHÉ .....................................................................................Pierre-Yves Néron
DOSSIER : IMAGINATION ET ÉTHIQUE
23-25 INTRODUCTION Les vertus de l’imagination..................................................................Christine Tappolet
26-33 IMAGINING EVIL ............................................................................................................................Adam Morton
34-49 IMAGINING OTHERS ..................................................................................................................Heidi L. Maibom
50-65 L’IMAGINATION ET LES BIAIS DE L’EMPATHIE ..............................................Martin Gibert et Morgane Paris
66-82 FAUSSETÉS IMAGINAIRES................................................................................................................Yvan Tétreault
83-100 LE MÉDECIN-ÉCRIVAIN, L'ÉTHIQUE ET L'IMAGINAIRE .....................................................................Marc Zaffran
DOSSIER : L'ÉTHIQUE ET L'IMPACT DES POLITIQUES PUBLIQUES SUR LA SANTÉ
101-104 INTRODUCTION POURQUOI L’ÉTHIQUE DE LA SANTÉ PUBLIQUE DEVRAIT-ELLE S’INTÉRESSER
À L’IMPACT DES POLITIQUES PUBLIQUES SUR LA SANTÉ ?...................................................................Michel Désy
105-118 THE POLITICAL ETHICS OF HEALTH .............................................................................................Daniel Weinstock
119-130 ALLERGIES AND ASTHMA: EMPLOYING PRINCIPLES OF SOCIAL JUSTICE AS A GUIDE IN PUBLIC
HEALTH POLICY DEVELOPMENT .....................................................................................................Jason Behrmann
131-139 AUTONOMY PROMOTION IN A MULTIETHNIC CONTEXT: REFLECTIONS ON SOME NORMATIVE ISSUES ......Michel Désy
140-155 DE L’INCITATION À LA MUTUALISATION : POURQUOI TAXER? ...........................................................Xavier Landes
156-169 MANAGING ANTIMICROBIAL RESISTANCE IN FOOD PRODUCTION: CONFLICTS OF INTEREST
AND POLITICS IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF PUBLIC HEALTH POLICY..............Bryn Williams-Jones et Béatrice Doizé
RÉSUMÉ
La conception de la promotion de la santé consacrée dans la Charte d'Ottawa accorde à l'auto-
nomie une place centrale. Or, il n'est pas clair que la santé définie au sens large et l'autonomie
soient liées au sens où semblent l'entendre les auteurs de la Charte. De plus, la promotion de
l'autonomie auprès de groupes qui ne la considèrent pas comme une valeur centrale reste à jus-
tifier. Le présent texte présente une conception de l'autonomie et de sa promotion qui permet
de répondre à ce dernier problème. Des exemples de politiques publiques en contexte plurieth-
nique sont donnés afin d'illustrer comment la conception de la promotion de l'autonomie pro-
posée se démarque de politiques plus coercitives.
ABSTRACT
The concept of health promotion enshrined in the Ottawa Charter grants an important place to
autonomy. However, it is not clear that health broadly defined and autonomy are related in the
sense intended by the authors of the Charter. Moreover, promotion of autonomy towards groups
who do not consider it as a core value remains a problem. This paper presents a concept of auto-
nomy and promotion that provide a partial answer to this problem. Examples of public policy in
a multiethnic context are given to illustrate how the proposed conception of autonomy promo-
tion differs from more coercive policies.
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INTRODUCTION
The field of action specific to public health has broadened con-
siderably over the last century. The reasons for this expansion are
multiple. One of the main reasons is that the range of problems we
seek to eradicate through such action is no longer – at least in Western
countries –composed of infectious diseases and parasitic infections
whose causes were identified and treated with the help of scientific
breakthroughs in the field of medicine and epidemiology1. Today, a
substantial portion of the problems being addressed by public health
workers stem from people’s living habits, specifically those habits
considered to be harmful to people. We have only to think of obesi-
ty. We understand well enough, for example, what causes this prob-
lem (inactivity, among other things), but we have trouble grasping
how to properly remedy such a problem, because it is largely caused
by multiple distal factors (including social and environmental factors)
that influence our living habits, and these factors seem too far removed
causally from said problems to be clearly isolated as the causes of
the problems in question. Moreover, and more importantly, these prob-
lems are, for the most part, the harmful consequences of activities
freely engaged in by the persons concerned. Consequently, public
health interventions now go beyond efforts to prevent problems stem-
ming from poor living habits, to include actions aimed at promoting
good health; the idea is that such promotion should target common
factors that are positively associated with good health through a mul-
tidisciplinary approach, currently defined as health promotion.2
However, if we seek to promote specific behaviours and values asso-
ciated with good health – if we embrace a strong perfectionist posi-
tion in public health – then, how do we deal with the fact that, first-
ly, people are, under certain circumstances, free to harm themselves,
and secondly, that good health might be embodied in an indefinite
number of lifestyles? How does perfectionism in health promotion
deal with diversity, on the one hand, and with permissible harm to
oneself, on the other? The goal of the present article is to offer a
partial solution to this problem, by considering the role of autonomy
in health promotion and by proposing a conception of autonomy that
is able to properly deal with these problems.
HEALTH AND AUTONOMY
At this point, a clearer conception of what health promotion seeks
to promote is required. The redefinition of the very notion of what
it means to be healthy can be seen as evidence of a shift in the par-
adigm alluded to in the previous section. Indeed, this shift was recent-
ly given concrete expression in the 1986 Ottawa Charter, whose pro-
posed definition of health extends far beyond the classic – negative
– conception of health (i.e. health defined as the absence of patholo-
gies). The Charter stipulates that:
Health is, therefore, seen as a resource for everyday
life, not the objective of living. Health is a positive con-
cept emphasizing social and personal resources, as well
as physical capacities. Therefore, health promotion is not
just the responsibility of the health sector, but goes
beyond healthy lifestyles to wellbeing (WHO, 1986).
According to the Charter, the goal of health promotion is to help
individuals “reach a state of complete physical, mental and social
wellbeing”. The preferred means of achieving this state of wellbe-
ing and, therefore, the goal of much health promotion action, is to
ensure the capacity of individuals to exercise control over their lives,
to direct their own lives – in short, to be autonomous. In fact, many
studies have demonstrated that individuals who have little or no con-
trol over their lives are generally less healthy than others.3 Autonomy
is thus seen as crucial to an individual’s health, understood here in
the broad sense of the word. Of course, the importance of autono-
my is not limited to the area of health: it is one of the central polit-
ical values of liberal democracies, for quite identical reasons: main-
ly, its contribution to human flourishing. Nevertheless, it is mainly
the place of autonomy within a certain conception of health and its
promotion that I wish to consider.
Cleary, the move from a narrow to a broad conception of health
– or health as wellbeing - can pose problems on many levels.4 Among
other things, a broad definition of what constitutes health is value-
laden.5 If we consider autonomy, it is clear that it is not only the
capacity to make meaningful choices, but also a moral value, the
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importance about which reasonable people can disagree. Thus, if we
focus specifically on the central role assigned to autonomy in the
broad conception of health, are we led to conclude that the health of
persons who do not appear to live autonomously is therefore inevitably
diminished as compared to that of those around them?
This problem derives from the fact that there seem to be a good
number of people for whom a life in which autonomy does not occu-
py a central place is desirable and for whom this does not seem to
produce harmful health effects. This is particularly true for persons
who belong to conservative religious groups. In fact, there are peo-
ple for whom obedience and self-denial are central values; for such
people, the promotion of autonomy by public institutions may very
well conflict unduly with their lifestyle. If this is true, as I maintain,
then the perspective that positions autonomy as the cornerstone6 of
health promotion must at the very least be clarified, if not substan-
tially modified to accommodate such cases.
TWO MEANINGS OF THE CONCEPT OF AUTONOMY
How can the concept of autonomy be clarified to shed some much
needed light on this problem? Part of the difficulty surrounding its
elucidation stems from the fact that autonomy has two distinct mean-
ings.7 Firstly, there is procedural autonomy, which refers to an indi-
vidual’s effective capacity to make choices independently of the influ-
ence of others. The formulation of this definition is somewhat inad-
equate, given the large degree to which our choices are causally
(directly or indirectly) influenced by our social environment, but we
nevertheless consider individuals to be independent who have osten-
sibly exercised this capacity, even if their choices resemble those of
their peers. Thus, we generally consider that procedural autonomy
may be fully exercised in the absence of undue external constraint.
If we consider the Charter’s definition of health, it seems, on the face
of it, to consider autonomy as a capacity. The second meaning refers
to substantive autonomy, which is not the capacity of individuals to
make choices, but rather the quality of the choices made. The sub-
stantive conception of autonomy is linked to the idea that there are
values which should be upheld by individuals if they are to be con-
sidered healthy in the broad sense of the term. Thus, substantively
autonomous individuals make the right choices with respect to their
lives, the choices that correctly embody what it means to be
autonomous; indeed, from this perspective, there are particular
lifestyles or values that concretely express what it means to live
autonomously. It isn’t obvious whether or not the definition of auton-
omy adopted by the Charter would consider it as encompassing its
substantive meaning; references to physical, mental and social well-
being are not explained. But, in parallel, it’s worth noting that pub-
lic health workers would hardly consider people who are clearly not
making healthy choices about their lives as being healthy. That may
be because the broad definition of health is generally understood as
involving the narrow one; if we consider our two definitions of auton-
omy, then we could say that procedural autonomy requires substan-
tive autonomy. In other words, we couldn’t be considered as having
the capacity for autonomy if we did not display apparent autonomous
choices8.
However, that is precisely the problem. It seems quite plausible
that there are deeply religious persons who choose autonomously, in
the procedural sense of the word, to live lives that do not assign a
central role to autonomy. Indeed, the fact that one leads a life of obe-
dience and self-denial does not mean that one has lost the capacity
to make choices. One might object, however, that such persons can-
not choose other than to lead a religious life because they are con-
strained simply by belonging to a particular group, that their culture
does not allow them to choose otherwise. Let us turn now to this
idea.
AUTONOMY AND CULTURAL BELONGING
In my view, the idea that some people cannot choose other than
to lead a religious life because they are constrained by belonging to
a particular group, rests on a false conception of the nature of cul-
tural membership. It presupposes that belonging culturally to a par-
ticular group implies exclusivity (that one is a member of only one
group) and inexorability (that one cannot be a member of another
group). However, to begin with, the idea that a culture is composed
of a group of consistent and stable characteristics that determine the
identity of its members is clearly doubtful. In fact, as noted by Tariq
Modood,9 among others, hardly anyone can be found who still defends
an essentialist conception of culture. Thus, cultural belonging does
not imply inexorable conformity. Also, the idea that the cultural
options available in a liberal community, for example, cannot be con-
ceived of as accessible to members of a religious group is doubtful
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as well. In fact, it is clear, for example, that the members of the con-
gregation of Grey Nuns of Montreal are aware of what life is like
outside their convent. It cannot be said, therefore, that this choice is
inaccessible to them, strictly speaking. Indeed, some of them leave
their congregations, even if such choices are frowned upon by mem-
bers of their community.
It must also be noted that, if one considers the mental health of
those in religious groups, the relationship between autonomy and
health does not appear to be as direct as one might think. In fact,
some studies have demonstrated that depression rates among the
Amish in the United States are half as high as those recorded for the
rest of Americans.10 As noted by Schwartz, American citizens have
never in their history had so much choice and, paradoxically, they do
not seem to benefit psychologically, but rather the contrary.11 This is
another facet of the idea put forth by Jeff Spinner-Halev, who notes
that conservative religious communities may offer fewer choices to their
members, but that these choices may be perceived as being personal-
ly more significant than those available in a liberal community.12
It should not be understood by this that we should all join closed
religious communities to improve our mental health – after all, the
data on the prevalence of depression among the Amish do not include,
for example, those who had to leave the community – but rather that
internalization of choices is a complex phenomenon that should be
taken into account when considering health promotion broadly
defined. In fact, these observations allow us to underscore a funda-
mental point regarding autonomy and cultural membership: a differ-
ence between a religious group and a liberal community lies in the
level of support and solidarity they usually provide. Indeed, tight-
knit communities often offer more support than the kind we usual-
ly find in our modern liberal societies. This intuition is confirmed
by studies on self-determination, which have demonstrated that it is
not so much the source and the objective quality of a person’s choic-
es as the support received while these choices are being made that
positively affects a person’s wellbeing.13 Since supportive close-knit
subgroups (such as families) are not restricted to conservative reli-
gious communities, we should not conclude that meaningful sup-
port towards health-influencing choices is absent from liberal soci-
eties, but simply that there does not seem to be a clear cut path from
substantive autonomy to health. So, in essence, this means not only
that there are distinct healthy lifestyles that value autonomy quite dif-
ferently, but that the link from autonomy to health is more complex
than what is sometimes conveyed through health promotion literature.
At the very least, this observation leads us to observe that the
quality of the choices people make (their substantive autonomy) is of
secondary importance to their health relative to their capacity to make
choices (their procedural autonomy)14. Consequently, any theory that
seeks to clarify the relationship between autonomy and health should
underscore the precedence of procedural over substantive autonomy.
This precedence is of major significance to any valid conception of
autonomy promotion, and I will now consider such a conception.15
WHAT IS AUTONOMY PROMOTION?
What form should a conception of autonomy promotion take, par-
ticularly if it must be justifiable to those who do not consider auton-
omy to be important? The main issue at stake here is that of pater-
nalism. Determination of the level of paternalism considered accept-
able in a state’s interventions in the lives of its citizens is a clas-
sic normative problem in the public health field.16 What is general-
ly implied by paternalism is the idea that the state is justified in
forcing individuals to act in their own interests when it is apparent
that people are going to behave in a manner that is harmful to them-
selves. Paternalism stems from the idea that it is sometimes neces-
sary to intervene to protect individuals from themselves. Clearly,
situations exist in which such interventions are justifiable – when,
for example, individuals do not have the capacity to make informed
choices (as in the case of children), when the restrictions placed on
individuals are, broadly speaking, negligible (as in the case of
mandatory seat belt laws), or when the consequences of one’s harm-
ful actions extend to other people (as in the case of cigarette smok-
ing). However, in J.S. Mill’s classical work on the subject17, pater-
nalism, as briefly defined here, is rejected for the simple reason
that its proponents are not able to morally justify the proposed con-
straints on the freedom of the individuals concerned, since these
constraints are coercive and when the targeted individuals are capa-
ble of autonomous choice.
It is useful to distinguish four types of paternalism. Strong pater-
nalism is the view that the state can legitimately prevent persons from
acting in a manner that is contrary to their own interests; weak pater-
nalism is the view that the state should seek the informed consent of
persons to accept such practices, rather than attempting to oblige them
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against their will to act in to their own interest; narrow paternalism
is limited to the use of coercive mechanisms; and broad paternalism
includes other forms of intervention typical of public health, for exam-
ple, empowerment, collaboration, information and so on.
The position most compatible with the conception of autonomy
and its promotion defended in this text is that of weak and broad
paternalism. Weak paternalism is congruent with the conception of
autonomy promotion defended here because, by seeking above all to
ensure the consent of individuals, it assigns priority to the informed
exercise of the capacity to make choices, and not to the quality of
the choices thus made. Weak paternalism depends, above all, on the
capacity to give one’s consent, on the absence of unacceptable coer-
cion (extortion, threats, physical coercion), and on assimilation of the
information relevant to the exercise of a choice.18 Weak paternalism
is thus very useful in cases involving religious or cultural practices
that large numbers of people who do not belong to the groups con-
cerned may consider in some way or other reprehensible or contrary
to one’s well-being. Indeed, we tolerate a large number of practices
when they respect the conditions established under weak paternalism
(think, for example, of certain sexual practices such as sadomasochism
and bondage, or partner swapping). If the conditions are not met for
freely chosen harmful behaviour – in the absence of valid consent19
– then weak paternalism reverts to strong paternalism. But, what is
important to remember here is that weak paternalism is compatible
with the idea that individuals may autonomously choose to limit their
own autonomy.
Broad paternalism opens the door to the use of an interesting range
of interventions. Nuritt Guttman20 has identified strategies that are
generally used in the field of public health: apart from coercion, we
find environmental strategies, incentives, persuasion, collaboration,
and facilitation. In the case being examined here, it must be empha-
sized that if weak and broad paternalism is the approach adopted,
then coercion must be removed from the list of strategies; the other
strategies are very much legitimate.21 Thus, we can envision a vari-
ety of strategies involving incentives, collaboration or facilitation
(these are in fact the strategies preferred for empowerment initia-
tives) aimed at promoting autonomy.
AUTONOMY, PATERNALISM AND ADAPTIVE
PREFERENCES
One objection to broad and weak paternalism can be expressed
through reference to the problem of adaptive preferences. The concept
of adaptive preferences refers to the idea that we all have a tendency
to choose what is relatively accessible to us and not to choose what is
not so accessible. The relative inaccessibility of certain choices may
itself “constrain” some people to accept lives that are contrary to their
wellbeing. The classic example of the problem of adaptive prefer-
ences is that of the status of women living in countries where their
autonomy is not valued, who themselves internalize this value sys-
tem and apparently consent to lead a life that is not autonomous.22
Part of the solution to this problem has already been evoked. Such
constraint cannot be attributed to the very culture of individuals
because the idea that we are acted upon by social regularities is mean-
ingless. It is rather that these roles are often enforced through coer-
cive measures.
Part of the answer to the problem of adaptive preferences can be
found in the conceptions of autonomy and weak paternalism that have
been presented here. Firstly, the idea that autonomy can be promot-
ed in isolation does not make sense. The solution to the problem of
adaptive preferences necessitates a conception of autonomy promo-
tion that includes several accompanying measures aimed at ensuring
its success. Martha Nussbaum, emphasizing this point, states that
autonomy promotion must be reinforced by physical and psycholog-
ical integrity, the absence of coercion (which is consistent with the
absence of coercion demanded by weak paternalism), the possibility
of maintaining significant social relationships (which is consistent
with the idea that the quality of social relations is closely tied to the
exercise of autonomy), the possibility of escaping from unfavourable
environments, and access to quality information. Weak paternalism
should ensure that if these conditions are met and the persons con-
cerned persist in leading a life that might be considered contrary to
their wellbeing, their choice must be respected.
This, in turn, underlines the fact that the conception of autonomy
promotion defended here respects the endorsement constraint
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described by Ronald Dworkin, which stipulates that a life cannot be
fully appreciated unless it is endorsed. As the latter states:
“Threats of criminal punishment corrupt rather than
enhance critical judgment, and even if the conversions
they induce are sincere, these conversions cannot be
counted as genuine in deciding whether the threats have
improved someone’s life”23
The conception I have defended here offers a solution to the appar-
ent paradox of autonomy promotion referred to earlier in this text. It
in fact proposes a way of reconciling the responsibility of institutions
to protect and promote autonomy and the basic freedoms of persons
who do not consider autonomy to be important. This conception may
have relevance not only for policies aimed specifically at empower-
ing individuals or communities, but also for policies that may relate
to the issue of reasonable accommodation.24 How then can we shed
light on public policies addressing diversity issues using the distinc-
tion between weak and strong paternalism?
Table 1 classifies various policies that address the issue of cultur-
al pluralism in one way or another. The policies are classified accord-
ing to whether or not they are based on weak paternalism and accord-
ing to the level of importance they assign to autonomy. Case 1 includes
policies for which autonomy promotion is one of the main objectives
and which employ coercive means, usually legislative measures that
criminalize illiberal practices that are judged contrary to individual
autonomy. These policies are motivated by the conviction that we must
protect certain vulnerable sub-groups within given groups by forbid-
ding certain practices; thus, the example used in the table is the erad-
ication of excision, but any other example of a targeted policy coer-
cively protecting the autonomy of a “minority within a minority”25
would have served equally well, such as, for example, the ban on
wearing the veil in public schools in France. Case 4 also includes
policies for which autonomy promotion is central, but only those
which do not use coercive methods. To return to the case of exci-
sion, instead of using a coercive approach, a number of initiatives in
many countries have sought to reduce the abuses related to this prac-
tice and to change the conditions that lead to its being widespread
in the first place; and in fact, these initiatives have been generally
more effective that coercive eradication policies.26 Cases 2 and 5 refer
to policies for which autonomy promotion is a secondary objective.
This category includes, among others, social or family policies whose
implementation would render illegal any cultural practice judged con-
trary to autonomy promotion, as defined by the policy. For example,
Canada does not recognize polygamous marriages but nevertheless
Table 1. Examples of public policies characterized by their degree of pater-
nalism and the level of importance assigned to autonomy promotion
awards rights to women who have contracted such marriages, in case,
for example, of separation. This situation contrasts with that in France,
where not only are polygamous marriages illegal, but following adop-
tion of the Pasqua law in 1993, women who had contracted such mar-
riages and were living in France were expelled from the country.27
This law would be a good candidate for case 2. A policy that decrim-
inalizes polygamy and actively seeks to award rights to women in
polygamous unions would be a good example of case 5.
Cases 3 and 6 refer to policies that may encroach, for potentially
justifiable reasons, on the autonomy of certain cultural or religious
sub-groups by prohibiting a practice that is a central to the group’s
identity. These two categories obviously have less to do with auton-
omy promotion than the others, and yet, given its importance, must
still be taken into consideration. As an example, we have only to
think of safety policies that impinge on the clothing customs of cer-
tain religious groups. Such a policy would be coercive (case 3) if it
invariably gave clothing-related safety demands precedence over cul-
tural practices with which they entered into conflict; for example, the
mandatory wearing of a safety hat on job sites and orthodox Sikh
employees; or the wearing of pre-determined clothing in an operat-
ing room and Muslim employees. On the other hand, if the policy
was reasonably accommodating, i.e. it openly recognized the damag-
ing effects of imposing clothing obligations on certain persons due
to their inclusion in a given group, and recognized that the accom-
modation of such persons did not necessarily constitute an excessive
burden for the organizations having to apply the policy, it would be
considered non-coercive (case 6).
These few considerations are aimed at illustrating types of poli-
cies in which autonomy promotion in a multiethnic setting plays a
role. If the conception of autonomy promotion presented here is a
valid one, then any policy for which it is an important goal (or even
a significant concern) should normally opt for non-coercive methods
or, as I have termed this approach, for weak and broad paternalism,
when the conditions for weak paternalism are met. The central role
played by autonomy in the health of individuals has been explicitly
recognized in the field of public health, but, if the conception pre-
sented here is valid, then 1) its promotion should be included with-
in a broader framework of policies aimed at improving people’s health
and 2) its promotion cannot rely on coercive methods, without inval-
idating itself, when the behaviour or custom in question is freely
chosen. As a final note, it can be anticipated that policies inspired
by the conception presented here would be more likely to achieve
their goals than policies inspired by strong paternalism.28
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1 Not to say, of course, that we don’t face such problems today.
2 See for example Crosby, R. A., Kegler, M. C. & DiClemente, R. J.“Understan-
ding and Applying Theory in Health Promotion Practice and Research.” In
DiClemente, R. J., Crosby, R. A., & Kegler, M. C.. Emerging Theories in Health
Promotion Practice and Research. San Francisco, Jossey-Bass, 2002, 432 pages.
3 See Rissel, C. (1994), to name just one.
4 See Seedhouse, (1995).
5 See for example Holland’s remarks, (2007), pp. 92-93.
6 Not to say the Holy Grail of health promotion, to quote Rissel.
7 Regarding this distinction, see Christman (2003).
8 It should be pointed out that the distinction between substantive autonomy and
procedural autonomy finds its parallel in more sophisticated definitions of health,
in the broad sense. In fact, it can be maintained that health derives from a com-
bination of factors, including the basic capacities of individuals (procedural)
and the objective manifestations associated with good health that stem from
these capacities (substantive). See, for example, the respective positions of
Brülde (2000) and Tengland (2006).
9 Modood (1998).
10 In Schwartz (2000).
11 See Schwartz (2004), especially Chapter 5.
12 In Spinner-Halev (2000).
13 See Ryan & Deci (2000).
14 Indeed, this seems to be the central theme of the Charter, notwithstanding ref-
erences to physical, mental and social wellbeing.
15 Perhaps it should also be maintained that a valid conception of health promo-
tion should, similarly, assign priority to the strengthening of the capacities cru-
cial to health, over the quality of the effective choices made by the individuals
concerned. Exploration of this idea, unfortunately, falls outside of the scope of
this paper.
16 See for example Childress et al (2002) as well as Bayer & Fairchild (2004).
17 Mill (1859).
18 In fact, as noted by Joel Feinberg, weak paternalism is not really paternalism
as it is generally understood, because it does not seek to justify restricting the
exercise of autonomy by individuals in the interests of their wellbeing. See
Feinberg (1986), pp.15-16.
19 We can define consent on a scale proportional to the potential harm being con-
sidered. For instance, if the practice being considered involves unalterable body
modification through surgery, then consent would have to be explicit, informed
and uncoerced (for example, excision or circumcision). On the other hand, if
the practice being considered is relatively benign, then implicit consent is suf-
ficient in most cases (for example, wearing a kippa or a hidjab).
20 See Guttman (2000).
21 Guttman maintains that persuasion is to some degree coercive. The question of
whether the strategies associated with broad paternalism are themselves on some
levels coercive is an interesting one; however, it exceeds the scope of this paper.
22 See, among others, Nussbaum,(2000).
23 Dworkin (2000), p.218.
24 See Désy (2007).
25 To borrow the title of the book by Eisenberg and Spinner-Halev.
26 See Shell-Duncan & Hernlund (2000).
27 For more on this subject, see Campbell et al (2005).
28 An interesting parallel can be drawn between the conception defended here and
harm reduction of substance abuse. In both cases, the approach advocated pro-
motes ongoing contact between the targeted population and the public institu-
tions implementing policies, as opposed to repression and criminalization, which,
let it be stressed, have not succeeded in producing significant positive results.
See, among others, Marlatt (1998).
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